Failed States and Fragile Societies

A New World Disorder?

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Crime, Low-Intensity Conflict, and the Future of War in the Twenty-First Century

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Attempts to anticipate the future of war should be undertaken with great humility. Too often, analysts are too strongly influenced by immediate experiences; and determined not to repeat the mistakes of recent military endeavors, they are proven incorrect in their assumptions and planning for the future. After Vietnam, for example, the United States was determined not to get directly involved in another counterinsurgency campaign and structured its military doctrine around the use of overwhelming military power to be used only in cases of vital national interest. Yet, a few decades later, two of the largest US military interventions morphed into the costly, difficult, and long-lasting counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Similarly, the end of the Cold War led many analysts to conclude that large-scale interstate war was over. But is it? A US air attack on Iranian nuclear facilities could lead to Iran's firing surface-to-surface missiles at US ships, and subsequent US action to take out the missile batteries and disable Iran's nuclear facilities, leading potentially to major combat between US and Iranian ground troops. Although it may be true that given the preponderance of US military power, the United States will become involved in war against only enemies employing asymmetric capabilities and strategies, there can be great differences in asymmetric wars. During Israel's 2006 military foray into Lebanon to suppress Hezbollah, for example, Israel unexpectedly found itself facing a nonstate actor armed with capabilities typical of a state—air defenses, secure communications, and antitank and antiship weapons. While a future

war with China—whether over Taiwan or to counter Chinese aggressive actions in the Asia-Pacific theater—would be extraordinarily costly and should be avoided, it is hardly inconceivable.

THE COMPLEX SPECTRUM OF FUTURE WAR AND THE PERSISTENCE OF INTERSTATE WAR DESPITE ITS MANY ASYMMETRIES

The end of the Cold War was accompanied by the widespread belief that the era of great-power wars was over. The Gulf War's Desert Storm campaign, at the cusp of the new era, was regarded by many analysts as probably the last major interstate military operation. The genocide in Rwanda, the rebellion in Chechnya, the interethnic violence in the former Yugoslavia, and the intensifying civil war in Colombia dominated the news. Scholars such as Mary Kaldor and Mark Duffield wrote of new wars—internal, disorganized, blurring the lines between civilians and combatants.[1] Analysts focused on ethnic and religious wars, even raising the specter of a clash of civilizations.[2] Partially in reaction to such arguments, scholars such as Paul Collier, Mats Berdal, David Keen, and others argued that increasingly wars were driven not by ideological ambitions or political grievances, but by economic profit motivations, and that wars created their own systems of economic rents, rather than representing a complete breakdown of order and economic structures.[3] Even as states as governing entities with a monopoly on coercive power were seen to be failing in many regions, new structures and economic logics of internal conflict were seen to be arising.

Al-Qaeda's 9/11 attack against the United States propelled ideology—salafi jihadism, specifically—back into the focus of analysts, but nonstate actors and so-called ungoverned spaces where state presence was weak still dominated the content of military analysis. Counterinsurgency and civil war mitigation efforts became intertwined with counterterrorism. After all, a nonstate actor caused massive casualties inside the homeland of the greatest superpower. The United States was helping to fight terrorism and insurgency from the Philippines through Colombia, assisting in toppling the Islamic Courts Union, a group of Islamists that seized power in war-torn Somalia. Even the conventionally designed US Operation Iraqi Freedom, aimed at deposing the "rogue" regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and disabling its (nonexistent) weapons of mass destruction, quickly became embroiled in the intercommunal conflicts of the country and transformed into a full-blown counterinsurgency operation.

These various military efforts to alter the internal political arrangements in countries reasserted the influence of intelligence operatives—not in their

Cold War cloak-and-fedora undercover incarnation, but instead in blurring the lines between them and special operations forces. Military actions abroad, such as in Pakistan where al-Qaeda and the Taliban found safe havens or in Somalia, featured high-tech robotics and unmanned vehicles often fed target information by ragtag warlords and proxies on horses. Such technologies have spread to nonstate actors, including criminal groups that already use cyber sabotage and who soon will have their own miniature drones. In the twenty-first century, civilians are at risk not just from improvised explosive devices deployed by insurgents, but also potentially from cyber attacks on advanced societies, which could knock out electrical grids, cut off energy supplies to hospitals, paralyze trade and traffic, and sabotage secure facilities.

Especially after the protracted counterinsurgency wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, many NATO countries, including the United States, lost their taste for waging out-of-theater wars to alter internal conditions in other countries. Thus, offshore airstrikes and drone operations came to be embraced as a key tool of counterterrorism in the second decade of the twenty-first century instead of the boots on the ground that characterized the first decade. High-tech warfare with unmanned platforms controlled from remote command centers, combined with full-zone-of-conflict, real-time information, seems to promise that war can be neat, clean, and highly controllable even in remote places, the experience of Afghanistan and Iraq notwithstanding.[4]

These technologies have increased the sense not only that war can be controlled, discriminate, and sanitized, but also, by bringing to citizens in advanced societies real-time images of the suffering of distant poor oppressed peoples, that it can generate support for "responsibility-to-protect" (R2P) humanitarian military intervention. The brutality of the internal wars of the 1990s, during the era of great economic prosperity in North America and Western Europe, whetted the appetite and determination of Western governments to prevent any future genocidal wars and atrocities à la Rwanda. The notion that states can enjoy sovereignty from external intervention only as long as they protect their citizens from brutal human rights abuses was eventually codified in the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.[5]

But the protracted and painful wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the economic difficulties that beset the United States and the European Union, the champions of the responsibility to protect doctrine, quickly soured their publics and leaders on interventions for reasons other than vital national security objectives. The deployment of local "peacekeeping" forces, such as those of the African Union, has been seen as an answer to the risks and costs of R2P interventions. Still, Western countries have not been able to resist the temptation

to intervene at least from the air in the Libya conflict to depose Gadhafi, even if they were not willing to commit ground forces to prevent subsequent chaos, and to provide at least financial support to rebels and the Syrian population being slaughtered by the bloodthirsty Bashar al-Assad regime. But this great visibility, real-time communications, and information flows around the globe also mean that war messaging to domestic audiences is quickly transmitted to distant war theaters, often with undesirable foreign policy outcomes. Promises and mobilization of domestic audiences can no longer be confined to just them, but almost immediately also influences the resolve of faraway military opponents and attitudes of contested populations.

However, while the opening decade of the twenty-first century was seized with counterterrorism and regime change operations, interstate war was not fully absent in war planning. Nor will it likely be absent over the next several decades. Periodic military provocations by North Korea could have triggered a military confrontation with the South and drawn in the United States, and are hardly resolved in the second decade of the twenty-first century. Taiwanese independence ambitions flared up several times during the century's first decade; and both Chinese and US conventional, nuclear, and cyberwar forces are today being sized and designed for the possibility of someday having to fight one another in a cross-straits conflict. The increasingly passionate disputes over islands and underwater resources in the South China Sea could potentially trigger wars between China and Japan or China and the Philippines and even draw in the United States. In 1999, India and Pakistan fought their fourth war, and after the 2002 bombing of the Indian parliament by a Pakistani terrorist group, the two countries came perilously close to a fifth war, and continue to plan for that contingency.

Ominously, such confrontations on the Indian subcontinent have the potential to escalate into a nuclear exchange, given the precarious lines of control over the Pakistani nuclear arsenal and Pakistan's tendency to move nuclear-armed missiles during crises to avoid a disarming strike by India and a lack of crisis communications lines and early warning systems. Also, nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, triggered by Iran's determination to acquire nuclear weapons, could give rise to small and vulnerable nuclear arsenals in the Middle East that would put to the test concepts of mutual assured destruction and the existential deterrence capacity of nuclear weapons.

The very large spectrum of the shape of military conflict in the twenty-first century is underpinned by a structure of international relations characterized by great fluidity of alliances, unreliability of allies, and overall independence and nonalignment of major state actors as well as the presence of armed non-state actors—what Seyom Brown calls "polyarchy."[6] Supposed allies will find

little motivation to join coalitions of the willing to counter faraway threats to the global order not just in direct military confrontations, but even in applying economic sanctions against rogue regimes (viz., the unwillingness of India, Brazil, and South Africa to join the sanctions regime against Iran, let alone the opposition of Russia and China). Local proxy forces feeding intelligence to drones will similarly find that their interests overlap only to a small extent with their distant patrons and will promote their often-problematic local agendas, many times double-crossing their external sponsors. Disharmony and lack of unity within the military coalitions will to a great extent characterize the spectrum of war in the twenty-first century.

DOMESTIC CRIME AND ANTICRIME RESPONSES AS LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT AND URBAN WARFARE

An increasingly prominent kind of violence in large parts of the world— approaching the intensity and shape of intrastate warfare—is the violence between criminal groups, but also the violence of states in their anticrime operations. Mexico today provides the most vivid, albeit extreme, example. Over the past several years, the country has suffered from drug-trade-related violence, extraordinarily intense and grisly even by criminal market standards. Mexico's drug war has claimed more than 51,000 lives since 2006, with over 16,000 just in 2011, and over 9,000 in 2012.[7] Its drug trafficking organizations have been engaged in ever-spiraling turf wars over smuggling routes and corruption networks, turning the streets of some Mexican cities into macabre displays of gunfights and murders. The criminal groups have shown a determined willingness to fight Mexican law enforcement and security forces and an increasing ambition to control other illicit and informal economies in Mexico and to extort legal businesses. In parts of the country, criminal gangs dominate the lives of entire municipalities, and their reach extends to state governments.[8] Controversially, some analysts have labeled the Mexico phenomenon and its spillovers into Central America as "criminal insurgency," a label that the government of Mexico has vociferously rejected.[9]

Increasingly, not just remote rural peripheries but prominent urban areas will become the loci of potent crime.[10] Karachi represents one such version of urban criminality and violence approaching low-intensity conflict and approximating a microcosm of a complex civil war, albeit with casualty levels only in the hundreds per year. The violence there is a witches' brew of terrorism, ethnic militancy and political mobilization, mafia fights, and land-grabbing. It is also deeply and intricately linked to major political actors in Pakistan, with both political parties and Pakistan's intelligence services,

Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), stirring ethnically based urban strife and manipulating criminal mafias to advance their political purposes. Political parties have taken advantage of the violence to demand monetary contributions and political votes from the population on the basis of ethnic divisions. The ISI has often used the strife in Karachi as a justification for its interventions in Pakistan's political system.[11]

Responses to urban crime also have increasingly come to approximate urban warfare. From Colombia's Medellín to Jamaica's Kingston to Brazil's Rio de Janeiro to Mexico's Ciudad Juárez, governments have resorted to using heavily armed police or actual military forces to retake territories with urban slums with minimal state presence, essentially governed by criminal or insurgent groups. Brazil adopted such a heavy-force takeover policy toward its shantytowns in the 2000s, first in São Paulo and then in Rio de Janeiro.[12] Rio's Pacification Policy (Unidade de Policía Pacíficadora [UPP]) toward the poor and crime-ridden *favelas* (slums)—home to 1.2 million of Rio's 6 million inhabitants—involving forcible takeovers and subsequent handovers to community police forces, has received widespread attention.[13] As of November 2011, nineteen UPP outposts had been established in the favelas, mostly those close to the 2014 Soccer World Cup and the 2016 Rio Olympics venues and to major Rio arteries. Policies in both cities drew lessons from a similar pacification policy, Grupamento de Policiamento em Áreas Especiais (GPAE), implemented with varied and limited effectiveness in Rio de Janeiro's favelas in 2000.[14] Both GPAE and UPP policies in Rio and its equivalent in São Paulo have sought to break with Brazil's historic pattern of deep social marginalization and isolation of the shantytowns by erecting physical walls around them, and resorting to highly repressive and violent, but only temporary, police excursions into the shantytowns controlled by criminal gangs.

In Mexico, President Felipe Calderón deployed the military into Mexico's streets to take over law enforcement functions in many of the country's cities, including Ciudad Juárez and Tijuana, which are troubled by intense violence generated by brazen and brutal drug trafficking organizations (DTOs). The strategy has been based on the premise that regular police forces in Mexico are so corrupt and hollowed out that they are unable to respond effectively to the violence and do not have the capacity to reduce the power of the DTOs. Once the military reduces the threat posed by the DTOs from a national security threat to a public safety problem and the police have been reformed, Calderón contended, the police would once again take over law enforcement functions. So far, Ciudad Juárez has seen the pullback of military forces and return of law enforcement to the police, even though extraordinarily high criminal violence in the city declined by only 24 percent from its peak levels, and the handover

had as much to do with public dissatisfaction with military forces in the city as with their effectiveness in bringing down violence and criminality.[15]

In Colombia's Medellín, the counterinsurgency and anticrime policies in the 2000s also followed similar patterns. President Álvaro Uribe first sent the military to the city in 2002 to retake the poor *comunas* ruled by the leftist guerrilla group the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (the FARC). The success of this Operation Orion in defeating the FARC in Medellín allowed the crime-lord-cum-paramilitary-leader Don Berna to consolidate control over the criminal markets in the city. His firm control over the poor comunas and a panoply of criminal rackets in the city resulted in a significant drop in homicides throughout much of the first decade of the 2000s. Medellín mayors Sergio Fajardo and Alonso Salazar took advantage of greater security in the city and extended a host of development activities to the poor comunas, including infrastructure and public spaces such as libraries. In the latter part of the decade, Don Berna was imprisoned and extradited to the United States. His departure from the city gave rise to new violence in Medellín, as tens of criminal groups emerged and have fought over control of drug smuggling and distribution, prostitution, extortion, and gambling.[16]

Another example comes from Kingston, Jamaica, where for several decades the Tivoli Gardens neighborhood has been ruled by drug gangs linked to Jamaican political parties. Since the 1990s and until 2010, this garrison was ruled by the drug lord Christopher "Dudus" Coke. When then Jamaican prime minister Bruce Golding finally yielded to US pressure to arrest Coke and extradite him to the United States in 2010, Golding sent a heavy force to Tivoli Gardens in an operation that resembled urban warfare more than a standard police arrest.[17] Coke ultimately surrendered to the United States, and Prime Minister Golding promised to adopt community policing and social development in Tivoli Gardens, though little has materialized so far.

In many of these countries, the state has been responding to violent challenges from "nongoverned spaces"—nongoverned only in the sense that they have not been governed by the states. The providers of governance there, brutal as it may be, have been violent nonstate actors such as gangs, criminal groups, and insurgents.[18] The state there was not failing—in many of these rural peripheries and urban slums, it was never present and consolidated in the first place, and its governance has been mediated by and dependent upon arrangements with the ruling nonstate overlords.

Yet, more and more, these ignored marginalized areas and their troublesome actors have impinged upon life in the state-controlled spaces. Increasingly, perceptions of public safety and the state's effectiveness and accountability will be determined by how effectively the state devises responses to crime and

insecurity in urban spaces. Yet in many of the world's major cities, law enforcement and social development have not caught up with the pace of urbanization, and there is a deep and growing bifurcation between developed and reasonably safe sectors of economic growth and social advancement and slums stuck in a trap of poverty, marginalization, and violence. Addressing the violence and lifting the slums from this trap will be among the major challenges for many governments.

ANTICRIME POLICIES AS A COMPETITION IN STATE-MAKING

An effective public safety and internal security response requires that responses to crime are conceptualized not as merely suppression of aberrant social behavior, but rather as a competition in state-making between the state and nonstate actors. Extensive criminality and illicit economies generate multiple threats to states and societies. They corrupt the political system by providing an avenue for criminal organizations to enter the political space, undermining democratic processes. Political entrepreneurs who enjoy the financial and political resources generated by their connections to illicit economies frequently experience great success in politics. They are able to secure official positions of power as well as wield influence from behind the scenes. The problem perpetuates itself as successful politicians bankrolled with illicit money make it more difficult for other actors to resist participating in the illicit economy, leading to endemic corruption at both the local and the national levels. Afghanistan, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Haiti are cases in point.

> Large illicit economies dominated by powerful traffickers also have pernicious effects on a country's law enforcement and judicial systems. As the illicit economy grows, the investigative capacity of those systems diminishes. Impunity for criminal activity increases, undermining the credibility and deterrence effects of law enforcement, the judicial system, and the authority of the government. Powerful traffickers frequently turn to violent means to discourage prosecution, killing or bribing prosecutors, judges, and witnesses. Colombia in the late 1980s and Mexico today are powerful reminders of the corruption and paralysis of law enforcement as a result of extensive criminal networks and the devastating effects of high levels of violent criminality on the judicial system. The profound collapse and penetration by criminal entities of Guatemala's judicial system led the country to embrace a special UN body, the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (Comisión internacional

contra la impunidad en Guatemala [CIGIG]), to help its judiciary com-
bat organized crime and state corruption.

Illicit economies also have large and complex economic effects. Drug cultiva-
tion and processing, for example, generate employment for the poor rural
populations and can even facilitate upward mobility. In Afghanistan, the drug
economy amounts to 20 to 30 percent of Afghanistan's gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) and directly and indirectly employs about 20 percent of the popu-
lation.[19] Illicit economies can have powerful microeconomic spillover effects
through boosting overall economic activity. Drug smuggling in the Mexi-
can state of Sinaloa generates strong positive spillover effects for the overall
economy in that locale by boosting demands for durables, nondurables, and
services that would otherwise be absent. The drug trade there is estimated to
account for 20 percent of Sinaloa's GDP, and for some of Mexico's southern
states, the number might be higher.[20] Indirectly, drug trafficking thus provides
livelihoods to poor populations. Consequently, sponsorship of illicit econo-
mies is an important source of political capital for criminal organizations.

But a burgeoning drug economy also contributes to inflation and can
hence harm legitimate, export-oriented, import-substituting industries as
well as tourism. It encourages real-estate speculation, undermines currency
stability, and also displaces legitimate production. Since the drug economy
is more profitable than legal production, requires less security and infrastruc-
ture, and imposes smaller sunk and transaction costs, the local population is
frequently uninterested in, or unable to participate in, other (legal) kinds of
economic activity. The presence of a large-scale illicit economy can thus lead
to a form of the so-called Dutch disease, where a boom in an isolated sector
of the economy causes or is accompanied by stagnation in other core sectors
since it gives rise to appreciation of land and labor costs. In Mexico, for ex-
ample, the drug violence has not only undermined human security and public
safety, but also decreased tourism in violence-affected areas, even as US firms
continue to invest there.[21]

Most importantly, burgeoning and unconstrained drug production and
other illicit economies and strong organized crime have profound negative
consequences not only for local stability, security, and public safety, but, at
times, also for national security.

CRIME AND HUMAN SECURITY

Although the threats that crime poses to the state may seem straightforward,
the relationship between crime and society is often highly complex. For many

people in areas of state weakness and multifaceted institutional deficiencies, participation in informal, if not outright illegal economies, such as the drug trade, is often the only way to satisfy their basic livelihood needs and obtain any chance of social advancement, even as they continue to exist in a trap of insecurity, criminality, and marginalization. The more the state is absent or deficient in the provision of public goods—starting with public safety and suppression of street crime and including the provision of dispute-resolution mechanisms and access to justice, enforcement of contracts, and the provision of socioeconomic public goods, such as infrastructure, access to health care, education, and legal employment—the more communities are susceptible to becoming dependent on and supporters of criminal entities and belligerent actors who sponsor the drug trade and other illegal economies.

By sponsoring illicit economies in areas of state weakness where legal economic opportunities and public goods are seriously lacking, both belligerent and criminal groups frequently enhance some elements of human security of those marginalized populations who depend on illicit economies for basic livelihoods, even while compromising other aspects of their human security and undermining national security. At the same time, simplistic law enforcement measures can and frequently do further degrade human security. These pernicious dynamics become especially severe in the context of violent conflict.

> Belligerent groups thus obtain far more than simply increased physical resources from their participation in illicit economies. They also derive significant political capital—legitimacy with and support from local populations—from their sponsorship of the drug and other illicit economies, in addition to obtaining large financial profits. They do so by protecting the local population's reliable (and frequently sole source of) livelihood from the efforts of the government to repress the illicit economy. They also derive political capital by protecting the farmers (or in the case of other illicit commodities, the producers) from brutal and unreliable traffickers (bargaining with traffickers for better prices on behalf of the farmers); by mobilizing the revenues from the illicit economies to provide otherwise absent social services such as clinics and infrastructure, as well as other public goods; and by being able to claim nationalist credit if a foreign power threatens the local illicit economy.
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> Criminal groups also provide public goods and social services, suboptimal as they may be.[22] In taking on such a role, Brazil's drug gangs, for example, have been able to dominate many of Brazil's poor urban areas, such as in Rio de Janeiro. Criminal groups and belligerents can even provide socioeconomic services, such as health clinics and trash disposal.

Surprising as it may seem, since criminal groups are the source of insecurity in the first place, they often also regulate the level of violence on the street and establish order, suppressing particular manifestations of street crime, such as theft, robberies, and rapes. Organized-crime groups, such as the *Primero comando da capital* in São Paulo's shantytowns, also provide dispute resolution mechanisms and even set up unofficial courts and enforce contracts.[23]

Especially if nonstate actors sponsor labor-intensive illicit economies in the context of poverty, the absence of legal livelihoods, and state's efforts to suppress the illicit economy, their political capital can be large.[24] Such political capital often motivates local populations to withhold intelligence on the belligerent group from the government if the government attempts to suppress the illicit economy. Accurate and actionable human intelligence is vital for success in counterterrorist and counterinsurgency efforts as well as law enforcement efforts against criminal groups.

From new warlords in Afghanistan to pirates in Puntland, such nonstate actors challenge not only the state by becoming alternative providers of public goods, but also traditional forms of governance and established tribal elites. By functioning as the distributors of socioeconomic goods and political-economic regulators, they can transform themselves into protostates.

A MULTIFACETED APPROACH TO COMBATING CRIME

Precisely because nonstate actors, including criminal groups, can take on the trappings of the state's might and legitimacy, and in areas of their operations even surpass the state in both attributes, states need to define their response as a competition in state-making, rather than merely a suppression of aberrant social behavior. An effective anticrime response in such a context is a multifaceted state-building effort that seeks to strengthen the bonds between the state and marginalized communities dependent on or vulnerable to participation in the drug trade and other illicit economies for reasons of economic survival and physical insecurity. Such a multifaceted approach requires that the state address all the complex reasons why populations turn to illegality, including law enforcement deficiencies and physical insecurity, economic poverty, and social marginalization. Efforts need to focus on ensuring that individuals and communities will obey laws—by increasing the likelihood that illegal behavior and corruption will be punished, but also by creating the social, economic, and political environment in which the laws are consistent with the needs of the people so that the laws can be seen as legitimate and hence be internalized.

Although a law enforcement response to pervasive crime is rarely sufficient, it is always necessary. Without public safety and effective enforcement of rules and contracts, socioeconomic approaches to crime will struggle to take off, legal economies will be hampered, and high violence levels will deter investment from coming in and society from mobilizing. There are many elements to an effective law enforcement strategy—from establishing a permanent police presence and developing local police forces, to adopting approaches such as problem-oriented policing and community-based policing, and to determining whether to prioritize street crime or setting up specialized interdiction units, to undertaking a comprehensive police reform. A careful assessment of local conditions is required to determine which deficiencies need to be addressed in what sequence.[25]

But a state's effective response must also include well-designed socioeconomic policies to address some of the root causes of criminality and to strengthen the bonds between the population and the state. Generating legal livelihood alternatives to economically motivated participation in crime in turn requires that the economic development strategy addresses all the structural drivers of illegal economic production. Beyond providing for security and the rule of law, such a comprehensive approach requires that stable property rights be established, access to microcredit be developed, access to education and health care be expanded, and major infrastructure deficiencies be redressed.[26]

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY FORCES AND THE NEXUS OF CRIME, TERRORISM, AND WAR

Modern militaries have not been designed and trained to deal with illicit economies and organized crime. Nonetheless, since before World War II, major militaries have engaged with and sometimes taken on criminal actors. The Japanese occupation forces in Manchuria had to contend for control of Shanghai with the potent Green Gang, a criminal group led by Du Yuesheng.[27] Relying on the mafia's assistance and intelligence provision was an integral part of the American campaign in Sicily during WWII.[28] Many of the twentieth-century insurgencies, from Mao Tse-tung's Long March to the Shining Path in Peru, were deeply intermeshed with illicit economies, including the drug trade.[29]

The frequency and intensity of international military forces' interactions with the nexus of violent conflict and crime and with criminal actors have grown since the 1990s. International military forces have increasingly encountered illicit economies and criminal actors in undertaking humanitarian inter-

ventions, such as in Somalia, and peacekeeping operations in civil wars, such as in Sierra Leone, and in dealing with terrorism and failed states. The Balkan wars and the international peacekeeping operations there were deeply overlaid with smuggling of various ilk and illicit economies often in reaction to, or spawned by, international sanctions and embargoes.[30] Saddam Hussein's continuing frustration of international efforts to isolate his regime and bring it to heel came precisely from his ability to turn an international sanctions regime into a lucrative illicit economy. The counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and state-building efforts in Afghanistan have been inextricably bound up with responding to Afghanistan's narcotics economy. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as individual countries ranging from the United States to Saudi Arabia to China, undertook a purely anticrime mission (i.e., the various antipiracy patrols off the coast of Somalia). How the revolutionary and social forces and postauthoritarian governments in Libya and Egypt manage to deal with the rise of organized and street crime and succeed in transforming enforcement from a tool of political oppression into an effective anticrime apparatus will to a large extent determine the fate of democracy and stability in the post–Arab Spring countries.

In encountering such illicit economies, international peacekeepers and outside intervention forces have had to grapple with difficult dilemmas: Criminal actors, including major warlords or key local political-military figures inside the official government of the country, can be potential spoilers in peace processes promoted by the international community. Consequently, for peace processes not to collapse, such actors often need to be brought into the new political arrangements; otherwise, the international forces need to bring resources to bear to neutralize such spoilers. The latter operations may require resources considerably in excess of what international forces are prepared to provide. The effort to neutralize such criminal actors is further complicated if they provide critical intelligence and other military assets. The United States, for example, relied on Afghan warlords, many of whom were or were to become major Afghan drug dealers, in its early operations in Afghanistan in 2001 and 2002 for intelligence and military operations.[31]

In other cases, political entrepreneurs with thick connections to the criminal world have systematically prolonged military conflicts to maintain access to high rents. Charles Taylor's machinations in Sierra Leone and Liberia to maintain access to the region's diamonds is probably the most notorious example.[32] Moreover, the empowerment of such entrepreneurs through engagement with international forces or their admittance into the postintervention/ postconflict political system may bring about a form of governance

that is extremely unpalatable not only to the international community sensitive to illegal economies such as the drug trade, but also to local populations subjected to the essentially discriminatory, predatory, and exclusionary mafia rule. Thus, the political system with deep linkages to criminal economies created in the wake of foreign intervention for the sake of stability may ultimately be highly unstable anyway.[33] Yet, for reasons discussed above, efforts by the international community to destroy an illicit economy on which large segments of local population depend for basic livelihood may be equally detrimental to peace and stability and may in fact fuel conflict while alienating the population from the international forces.

THE STATE AS MAFIA BAZAAR

Nor is it correct to assume that crime and illicit economies in a postconflict country are always *consequences* of the conflict situation. The postconflict shape of crime, the power distribution in the criminal market and its reverberations in the political system, and the particular type of illicit economy into which crime evolves in the postconflict phase may be new. But often the postconflict criminal and political arrangements have roots in the preconflict patronage, corruption, and rent networks.

West Africa provides a good illustration. The level of drug trafficking there—especially cocaine from South America en route to Europe—has increased dramatically over the past decade.[34] Driven by the newly intensified demand for cocaine in Western Europe, the shrinking of demand for cocaine in the United States, and the pressure on cocaine smuggling from interdiction operations in the Caribbean, the level of trafficking through West Africa has increased to a quarter of Europe's annual consumption.[35] With some countries, such as Guinea-Bissau, appearing to be overrun by drugs and significant political instability, coups, and assassinations linked to organized crime and the drug trade in the country, analysts worry about the threat that the drug trade poses to the rule of law, political stability, and the quality of governance in the region.

However, many of these institutional conditions have existed for years in West Africa and predate the emergence of the current intense drug trafficking through the region. Neither illicit economies nor the drug trade are new to West Africa. Indeed, the region has been characterized by a variety of illicit economies and their deep integration into the political arrangements and frameworks of the countries in the region. Much of the political contestation in West Africa has focused on getting access to the state to control rents from various legal, semi-illegal, or outright illegal economies—such as diamonds

(Sierra Leone and Liberia); gold and other precious metals, stones, and timber (Sierra Leone and Liberia); the extraction, monopolization, and smuggling of agricultural goods, such as cocoa (Côte d'Ivoire); trafficking in humans for sexual exploitation and domestic slavery (Mali, Togo, Ghana); oil (Nigeria); and fishing (often conducted illegally and destructively by international fleets from outside West Africa). Political contestation in these countries has often centered on taking over the state in order to control the main sources of revenue. In essence, the government has been seen as a means to personal wealth, not service to the people.[36]

Yet it would be a significant and often inappropriate leap of analysis to assume that "the drug trade epidemic" in West Africa will necessarily challenge political stability and threaten the existing governments and power of ruling elites. To the extent that external drug traffickers make alliances with the local nonelites—former or existing rebels not linked to the official system or young challengers who seek social mobility in an exclusive system—the traffickers will develop a conflictual relationship with the state, and political instability may well follow. To the extent that the governing elite captures the new rents, a symbiosis between external (and internal) drug traffickers and the ruling elites may develop. Drug traffickers will enjoy a sponsored safe haven; and while democratic processes and institutional development of the country will be threatened, political stability and the existing political dispensation may well be strengthened.[37] In many parts of the world where international peacekeeping or foreign forces intervene for counterterrorism, humanitarian, or conflict-control objectives, they may well find a governance system built around criminal enterprises where the dispensation of exceptions from law enforcement by the country's elites to their clients and patronage networks is an organic form of governance.

A CRIME-TERROR NEXUS?

Similarly, whether the intensification of the drug trade in West Africa results in the emergence of a nexus with international terrorism is highly contingent on local conditions and the terrorist group's skills. The level and shape of law enforcement against illegal economies in West Africa will critically influence the tightness of the crime-terror nexus. It is critical to avoid inadvertently driving the two actors together.

Criminal and terrorist groups may share overlapping networks, tactics, and intelligence. They may even work through the same logistical operators.[38] But although criminal groups and belligerent groups often interact with illicit economies in the same way, they have not morphed into a homogeneous

monolithic entity. Rather, a crime-terror nexus is far from stable or neces-
sarily inevitable. Indeed, such relations are often characterized as much by
violent conflict between the criminal organizations and the terrorist groups as
by cooperation.[39] At most, such relationships are tactical alliances of mutual
convenience.

Moreover, how successfully outside terrorist groups navigate new territo-
ries to which they may be drawn because of the presence of illicit economies
depends on their intelligence capacity, their cultural and human terrain aware-
ness, and their understanding of the complex relationship between official
politicians, governing elites, and illegal economic networks.

POLICY RESPONSES FOR DEALING WITH CRIME IN THE CONTEXT OF VIOLENT CONFLICT

Devising policy for international counteraction to local illegal economies in-
terlinked with belligerency is difficult in the abstract. Nonetheless, some im-
portant guidelines and considerations can be drawn from even this general
description of the crime-conflict nexus.

The mandates for international peacekeeping forces need to be based on
awareness that the more destroyed the legal economy is in the theater of inter-
vention, the more robust and deeply ensconced the illicit economy will be.
Prominent military and political actors in the region—possible allies or prox-
ies of the intervention forces—will also very likely be deeply involved in the
illicit economy, and their power inextricably linked to their ability to use the
illicit economy to provide for the population's elemental needs. Conversely,
however, the engagement of intervention forces with such actors will have
profound effects on the shape of and the power distribution within the illicit
economy, and thus within the country itself. Through their actions and en-
gagement with local power brokers, international military forces will thus
codify or alter the balance of power in the criminal market and hence in the
political landscape.

Rushing to destroy an illicit economy, such as illicit crop cultivation, in
the absence of readily available legal livelihoods will hamper the internation-
als' peacekeeping and counterinsurgency efforts. Moreover, in the absence of
security and a strong on-the-ground presence, the effectiveness of any illicit-
economy suppression efforts will be highly limited as well. No matter what
anticrime/counternarcotics efforts are ultimately undertaken—be it ironfisted
suppression of the illicit economy or a prior fostering of legal alternative
livelihoods—they will not be effective in reducing the illicit economy unless
firm security throughout the entire territory has first been established. The

state needs to be strengthened and conflict ended before efforts against illicit economies can be effective.

The more limited the scope of the outside intervention, the more limited will be the ability of the international forces to suppress or shape the crime-conflict nexus and illicit economies in the intervention area. Offshore, from-air interventions, as in the NATO operation against Gadhafi, give international actors a highly circumscribed ability to tackle local illicit economies. The more the intervention relies on local proxies, the higher the chance that they will capture not only political power in the postintervention phase but also the country's criminal markets. A criminal peace or peaceful criminal market run by the proxies may be the best the international community can hope for in such circumstances.

Expansion of the mission of international peacekeeping forces beyond the provision of security to direct efforts to reduce illicit economies and corruption requires that the international peacekeeping forces have a very detailed understanding of the intricacies of the local illicit economy and its nexus to violent conflict and the political and socioeconomic structures in the country. Such an enlargement of the traditional limited role of peacekeeping forces thus requires that the mission have a *continual* and robust information-gathering component that constantly monitors the effects the policies against illicit economies are having on the political and economic distribution of power in the area and on stability and development. Peacekeeping operations of this sort therefore must also have a robust analytical support component that includes political, economic, agricultural, anthropology, and criminology experts.

But, typically, outside intervention forces often not only have a poor capacity to understand local illicit economies and patronage networks of crime and politics, they often also lack the capacities to respond to crime. The absence of such capacities applies not only to organized crime but also to street crime. The rise in street crime is often the first and most direct way that local populations experience postintervention insecurity. Such an increase in street crime can again alienate the population from the state and the intervention force, stimulate a hankering for the *regime ancien*, empower extralegal power brokers, and even erect a criminal order. Yet both the outside intervention forces overall and their military police components are often ill-prepared to respond to street crime as well as to organized crime, nor can they effectively train local police forces. Neither military policing nor counterinsurgency-light approaches are adequate substitutes for traditional community-oriented policing skills. Thus, making a determined and systematic effort to develop police forces capable of tackling street crime and having training capacity geared

toward the suppression of crime would greatly enhance the effectiveness of international interventions.

If outside military forces and their civilian counterparts decide to promote "good" governance and undo existing criminal enterprises and illicit economies and prevent the emergence of new ones, they need to plan for and take on this effort early in the mission. The immediate and early postintervention, post-military-operations period is the critical and optimal time to shape the political and criminal environment in the country. At that time, local power brokers have the most uncertainty about the future and show the greatest restraint in directly or covertly challenging the intervenor. Their networks of power have often been weakened by the collapse of the previous order and they have not had time to reconsolidate and reconstitute their new power networks.

In the early postintervention period, the local population is also most willing to work with the intervenor in setting up the new order. Under the best of circumstances, the people have disliked the previous political regime and are now hopeful about the future. At minimum, the locals will be uncertain about the power and capabilities of the intervenor and fearful of actively resisting it. Any institutions and political arrangements that survived the war may be at their most pliable—most susceptible to being molded by the outside intervenor. The longer the intervention forces wait to set up capable state structures, the harder the state-building effort becomes. Military opposition emerges. Local power brokers' criminal and political networks are established or reestablished, and the population loses faith in the future. Undoing such negative trends becomes harder and harder as more time elapses. Remobilizing the support of the population becomes especially difficult. The window of opportunity closes rapidly, and at some point reversing the bad trends may become impossible.

Afghanistan in the post-2001 years provides an apt example. In 2002 and 2003, the Taliban were scattered. The local population welcomed being liberated from the Taliban and welcomed the United States. Political elites, including the country's warlords empowered by the design of the US minimalist intervention that relied on them for crucial intelligence and military services, were often dependent on the United States for anchoring their power. They were also careful of not jeopardizing their relationship with the United States—even as Washington and the US military forces in Afghanistan failed to assert their leverage. President Hamid Karzai was actively asking the United States to rein in and disempower the warlords. But the longer the United States dithered and continued defining the mission in Afghanistan in minimalist terms of destroying the Taliban regime only as opposed to helping build a new

state in Afghanistan, the more pernicious dynamics intensified. The Taliban insurgency erupted and grew in strength. The warlords became entrenched in the political system, and corruption, abuse, and nepotism intensified. President Karzai lost his wherewithal to challenge the warlords and instead bought them with state assets and foreign aid and came to tolerate their usurpation of power and resources. A subsequently more intense counterinsurgency campaign generated more deaths among the Afghan population, but no prospect of defeating the Taliban. The locals soured on America, and America soured on the Afghanistan effort.[40]

But it is important to recognize that the staying power of the international peacekeeping forces will always be inherently limited and that efforts to suppress illicit economies will be sustainable only if the population in the country and its political representatives have the economic and political incentives to support such policies.

It is unrealistic to expect that outside policy interventions can eradicate all organized crime and illicit economies or for that matter all the drug trade in the area of intervention. The priority for the international community should be to focus on the most disruptive and dangerous networks: those with the greatest links or potential links to international terrorist groups with global reach, those that are most rapacious and detrimental to society and the development of an equitable state, and those that most concentrate distribution of rents from illicit economies to a narrow clique of people. These three criteria may occasionally be in conflict, and such conflicts will pose difficult policy dilemmas. In addition to considering the severity of the threat posed to the international community and to the host state and society by such drug-trafficking or organized-crime groups, the estimated effectiveness of any policy intervention needs to be factored into the cost-benefit analysis of policy choices.

It is important to realize that indiscriminate and uniform application of law enforcement can generate several undesirable outcomes that need to be guarded against: First, the weakest criminal groups can be eliminated through such an approach, but it can inadvertently increase the efficiency, lethality, and coercive and corrupting power of the remaining criminal groups operating in the region. Second, such an application of law enforcement without prioritization can push criminal groups into an alliance with terrorist groups—the opposite of what should be the purpose of law enforcement and especially outside policy intervention. Both outcomes have repeatedly emerged in various regions of the world as a result of opportunistic, nonstrategic drug interdiction and law enforcement policies.

Finally, in determining whether and how to engage in the suppression of local illicit economies and organized-crime enterprises, the involved inter-

national agencies need to ask themselves some hard questions and consider second- and third-order effects of their policies. For example, is it better to have illegal poppy cultivation in Pakistan rather than Afghanistan and if so, should antipoppy policies in Afghanistan be maximized? Will antipiracy efforts off the coast of Somalia push piracy from the Gulf of Aden into the wider Indian Ocean and would that be a better outcome? If the international community imposes sanctions on a particular country, will that give rise to new highly profitable smuggling enterprises, and by whom will the profits be captured? Such questions do not have easy answers, and governments tend to be loath to contemplate them. But without anticipating such likely adaptations of criminal markets and enterprises to any such international interventions, and doing a careful cost-benefit analysis of various policy options, governments may only make the violent conflict of the twenty-first century more challenging for themselves.

NOTES

1. See, for example, Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999); and Mark Duffield, *Global Governance and New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security* (London: Zed Books, 2001).

2. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 22–49.

3. See, for example, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "On Economic Causes of Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers* 50, no. 4 (October 1998): 563–73; Mats Berdal and David Keen, "Violence and Economic Agendas in Civil Wars: Some Policy Implications," *Millennium* 26, no. 3 (1997): 795–818; and David Keen, *The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars*, Adelphi Paper No. 320 (Oxford: IISS/Oxford University Press, 1998).

4. For the dangers of assuming controllability of war as a result of technological advances and setting low thresholds for crossing over into military action, see Seyom Brown, *The Illusion of Control: Force and Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2003).

5. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *Responsibility to Protect* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001), http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf.

6. Ibid.

7. Alfredo Corchado, "Violence Levels off in Some Parts of Mexico, but Spreads to Others," *Dallas Morning News*, February 4, 2012. Mexico's newspaper *La reforma,* which until November 30, 2012, reported drug-related homicides on a weekly basis, puts the number through November 2012 at 47,253, while other

sources, including the Mexican government, put the 2006–2012 death toll at more than 60,000.

8. For details, see Vanda Felbab-Brown, *Calderón's Caldron: Lessons from Mexico's Battle against Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking in Tijuana, Ciudad Juárez, and Michoacán* (Washington, DC: Brookings, September 2011), http://www .brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2011/09_calderon_felbab_brown/09_ calderon_felbab_brown.pdf.

9. For pioneering work on the concept of criminal insurgencies, see, for example, John P. Sullivan, "Future Conflict: Criminal Insurgencies, Gangs and Intelligence," *Small Wars Journal*, May 31, 2009, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/ journal/docs-temp/248-sullivan.pdf?q=mag/docs-temp/248-sullivan.pdf.

10. For seminal work on urban criminality and urban spaces out of the control of the state, see Richard J. Norton, "Feral Cities," *Naval War College Review* 56, no. 4 (Autumn 2003): 97–106.

11. For details on Karachi, see "Into the Abyss," *Economist*, August 27, 2011; and Steve Inskeep, *Instant City: Life and Death in Karachi* (London: Penguin, 2011).

12. For the evolution of the policing response in São Paulo, see Jennifer Peirce, "Divided Cities: Crime and Inequality in Urban Brazil," *Paterson Review* 9 (2008): 85–98, http://www.diplomatonline.com/pdf_files/npsia/2009/PDF%20-%20 Jen%20Peirce%20-%20Crime%20and%20Inequality%20in%20Urban%20 Brazil.pdf; Ted Goertzel and Tulio Kahn, "The Great São Paulo Homicide Drop," *Homicide Studies* 13, no. 4 (November 2009): 398–410; and Teresa P. R. Caldeira, *City of Walls: Crime, Segregation, and Citizenship in São Paulo* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).

13. For an overview of the pacification policy, see, for example, Benjamin Lessing, "Depois da queda do Alemão: O futuro da guerra do tráfico" [After the fall of Alemáo: The future of Rio's drug war], *O Globo Online*: *Favela Livre*, December 16, 2010; and André Gomes Alves, "Segurança pública e polícia pacificadora: A fruição do direito a segurança pública nas favelas de Rio de Janeiro" [Public safety and police pacification: The attainment of the right to public security in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro] (University of Brasilia, June 2011), http://bdm.bce.unb.br/ bitstream/10483/1966/1/2011_AndreGomesAlves.pdf. For background on life in the favelas prior to UPP and the evolution of government policy responses, see, for example, Maria Helena Moreira Alves and Philip Evanson, *Living in the Crossfire: Favela Residents, Drug Dealers, and Police Violence in Rio de Janeiro* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2011); and Ben Pengalese, "The Bastard Child of the Dictatorship: The Comando Vermelho and the Birth of 'Narco-Culture' in Rio de Janeiro," *Luso-Brazilian Review* 45, no. 1 (2008): 118–45.

14. See, for example, Clarissa Huguet and Ilona Szabó de Carvalho, "Violence in the Brazilian *Favelas* and the Role of the Police," *New Directions for Youth Development* 119 (Fall 2008): 93–109; and Paul Chevigny, *Edge of the Knife: Police Violence in the Americas* (New York: Norton, 1995).

15. For details on the strategy, its effectiveness in particular Mexican cities, and its overall accomplishments and shortcomings, see Felbab-Brown, *Calderón's Caldron*. For the overall security policy in Mexico, including its police and judicial reforms, civil-military relations, anti-money-laundering and anti-gun-control measures, and the role of the United States, see Eric L. Olson, David A. Shirk, and Andrew Selee, eds., *Shared Responsibility: U.S.-Mexico Policy Options for Confronting Organized Crime* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center, 2010).

16. For details, see Adam Isacson, "Medellín: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back," in *Tackling Urban Violence in Latin America: Reversing Exclusion through Smart Policing and Social Investment* (Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America, June 2011), 6–9; and Vanda Felbab-Brown, "Reducing Urban Violence: Lessons from Medellín, Colombia" (Washington, DC: Brookings, February 14, 2011), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0214_colombia_crime_felbabbrown.aspx.

17. For details on Jamaica's drug gangs, their relationship to political parties, and the 2010 operation to arrest Coke, see Enrique Desmond Arias, "A Desk Study of Jamaica," in *Getting Smart and Scaling Up: The Impact of Organized Crime on Governance in Developing Countries*, ed. Camino Kavanagh (New York: Center on International Cooperation, New York University, June 2013); and Amanda Silvers, *Elections, Violence and the Democratic Process in Jamaica* (Kingston: Ian Randle, 2010).

18. Anne L. Clunan and Harold A. Trinkunas, eds., *Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State Authority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010).

19. Estimates of the size of the drug economy as a percentage of GDP and the number of people it employs vary a great deal. For smaller, more narrowly based estimates, see United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2011*, http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Executive_Summary_2011_web.pdf. For larger estimates, see Christopher Ward and William A. Byrd, *Afghanistan's Opium Drug Economy* (World Bank Report No. SASPR-5, December 2004).

20. Guillermo Ibarra in Manuel Roig-Franzia, "Mexico's Drug Cartels Take Barbarous Turn: Targeting Bystanders," *Washington Post*, July 30, 2008.

21. Randal C. Archibold, "Despite Violence, U.S. Firms Expand in Mexico," *New York Times*, July 10, 2011.

22. For details, see Vanda Felbab-Brown, "Human Security and Crime in Latin America: The Political Capital and Political Impact of Criminal Groups and Belligerents Involved in Illicit Economies," Florida International University, Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center, September 2011.

23. See, for example, Enrique Desmond Arias and Corrine Davis Rodrigues, "The Myth of Personal Security: Criminal Gangs, Dispute Resolution, and Identity in Rio de Janeiro's Favelas," *Latin American Politics and Society* 48, no. 4 (2006): 53–81.

24. For details on the factors that influence the size of the political capital nonstate actors derive from sponsoring illicit economies and the complex interactions such actors have with illicit economies, see Vanda Felbab-Brown, *Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2009).

25. For details on such aspects of law enforcement strategies in areas previously controlled by organized-crime groups, see Vanda Felbab-Brown, "Law Enforcement Actions in Urban Spaces Governed by Violent Nonstate Entities: Lessons from Latin America," Florida International University, Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center, September 2011.

26. For details on the design of such anticrime socioeconomic policies, see Vanda Felbab-Brown, *Bringing the State to the Slum: Confronting Organized Crime and Urban Violence in Latin America* (Washington, DC: Brookings, December 2011), http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2011/1205_latin_america_slums_felbab brown.aspx.

27. Brian G. Martin, *The Shanghai Green Gang: Politics and Organized Crime, 1919–1937* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).

28. See, for example, Joshua Hammer, "In Sicily, Defying the Mafia," *Smithsonian*, October 2010, http://www.smithsonianmag.com/people-places/In-Sicily-Defying-the-Mafia.html; and Alfred W. McCoy, *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972).

29. For a comprehensive list of insurgent and terrorist groups linked to the drug trade, see, Felbab-Brown, *Shooting Up*, appendix A.

30. See, for example, Peter Andreas, *Blue Helmets and Black Markets: The Business of Survival in the Siege of Sarajevo* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008).

31. See Felbab-Brown, *Shooting Up*, chap. 5.

32. See, for example, William Reno, *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); and Reno, *Warlords Politics and African States* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999).

33. For a detailed exploration of the dilemmas that peacekeepers encounter when dealing with the nexus of conflict and illicit economies and organized crime, see James Cockayne, "State Fragility, Organized Crime and Peacekeeping: Towards a More Strategic Approach," *Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre NOREF Report*, September 2011, http://www.globalct.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/A_More_Strategic_Approach_to_OC.pdf; and James Cockayne and Adam Lupel, eds., *Peace Operations and Organized Crime: Enemies or Allies? (New York: Routledge, 2011).*

34. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), *Transnational Trafficking and the Rule of Law in West Africa: A Threat Assessment* (Vienna: UNODC, July 2009).

35. See, for example, James Cockayne and Phil Williams, *The Invisible Tide: Towards an International Strategy to Deal with Drug Trafficking through West Africa* (New York: International Peace Institute, October 2009); and Joseph Kirschke, "The Coke Coast: Cocaine and Failed States in Africa," *World Politics Review*, September 9, 2008.

36. See, for example, George B. N. Ayittey, *Africa in Chaos* (New York: St. Martin's, 1999); and Geoffrey Wood, "Business and Politics in a Criminal State: The Case of Equatorial Guinea," *African Affairs* 103, no. 413 (2004): 547–67.

37. Vanda Felbab-Brown and James J. F. Forest, "Political Violence and the Illicit Economies of West Africa," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 24, no. 5 (2012): 787–806.

38. Douglas Farah, "Narcoterrorism and the Long Reach of U.S. Law Enforcement," Testimony in the U.S. House of Representatives House Committee on *Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade*, October 12, 2011, http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/fara101211.pdf.

39. Vanda Felbab-Brown, "Narcoterrorism and the Long Reach of U.S. Law Enforcement," Testimony in the U.S. House of Representatives House Committee on *Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade*, October 12, 2011, http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2011/1012_terrorism_drugs_felbabbrown.aspx.

40. This passage is based on Vanda Felbab-Brown's *Aspiration and Ambivalence: Strategies and Realities of Counterinsurgency and State Building in Afghanistan* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2013). See also Luke Mogelson, "Which Way Did the Taliban Go?" *New York Times Magazine*, January 17, 2013.

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