

C O N T E N T S



Preface	ix
1 The Debate about Perception: Inferentialism, Representationalism, and Intelligible Empirical Content	1
1. Representationalism versus Inferentialism	1
2. The Intelligibility of Empirical Content	10
2 The Debate about Perception: Rational Constraint, Phenomenology, and Interiorization	19
1. The Question of Rational Constraint	19
2. “Experience” in McDowell and a Phenomenological Elaboration	25
3. Rational Constraint: Critique	34
4. Interiorization	39
3 The Fullness of Perception	45
1. McDowell’s Disjunctivist Account of Perception	46
2. McDowell on Nonconceptual Content	61
4 Tradition and Discourse, I-We and I-Thou: McDowell and Brandom on Intersubjectivity	87
1. Intersubjectivity and the Debate on Perception	88
2. I-We Intersubjectivity, Its Ethical Dimensions, and the I-Thou Relationship	95
3. Self-Reflective Methodology and I-Thou Relationships	103
4. Ethical Intersubjectivity: Older than Epistemic Intersubjectivity	113
5 McDowell’s Wittgensteinian Quietism	129
1. Interiorization and Metaphilosophy	130
2. McDowell’s Nonconstructivism	135
3. McDowell and Natural Science	145
6 Self-Reflectivity, Radical Reflection, and Consciousness: Brandom’s Philosophy of Philosophy	153
1. Self-Reflectivity: Ultimacy and Essentiality	155
2. Theorizing the Pretheoretical	169
3. A Philosophy of Language or of Consciousness?	180
7 The Levels of Ethics	185
1. McDowell: Ethics and Practical Rationality	186

2. An Alternative View of Ethical Experience and Practical Rationality	193
3. A Discursive Ethics of Principles	209
8 Phenomenology, the Intentional Spectrum, and Intersubjectivity	217
1. Phenomenology and the Intentional Spectrum: The Perceptual Pole	218
2. Phenomenology and the Intentional Spectrum: The Eidetic-Theoretic Reflective Pole	226
3. Points of Tension: Intersubjectivity and Ethics	238
Notes	259
Bibliography	305
Index	319